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In most European broadband Internet markets local loop unbundling is mandated under a
cost-based regulated access price. We construct a model for differentiated Cournot competition
between service-based and infrastructure-based ﬁrms, out of which one infrastructure-based ﬁrm
(the incumbent) supplies to the service-based ﬁrms. We seek for and compare the socially
optimal and the incumbent’s proﬁt maximizing access price in two scenarios: (i) service-based
ﬁrms and incumbent supply homogeneous services (partial differentiation), and (ii) all services
are horizontally differentiated (uniform differentiation). We show that in both cases the
incumbent never forecloses service-based ﬁrms if infrastructure-based competition is present or
if services are somewhat differentiated. Under uniform differentiation the welfare optimizing
access price is below marginal cost, hence the incumbent subsidizes the production of
service-based ﬁrms and makes zero proﬁt. In the case of partial differentiation, the same result
obtains when both markets are concentrated. However, if markets are not concentrated, the
socially optimal access fee exceeds the marginal cost.
Key words: broadband Internet market, imperfect competition, product differentiation, access
regulation
JEL code: L13, L51, L86, L96
Abstract in Dutch
In de meeste Europese landen valt toegang tot de local loop van netwerken voor breedband
internet onder een regime van kostengeoriënteerde regulering. Dit paper analyseert een model
waarin bedrijven zonder en met een eigen netwerk met elkaar concurreren. We nemen aan dat
één bedrijf met eigen netwerk (de incumbent) toegang verleent aan bedrijven zonder eigen
netwerk. We vergelijken de welvaartsoptimale toegangsprijs met de toegangsprijs die de winst
van de incumbent maximaliseert in twee scenario’s: (i) de producten van alle bedrijven zijn even
sterk gedifferentieerd en (ii) de producten van de incumbent en de bedrijven zonder eigen
netwerk zijn homogeen. We laten zien dat in beide gevallen de incumbent bedrijven zonder
eigen netwerk niet uitsluit als er concurrerende netwerken bestaan of als de producten van de
incumbent en de bedrijven zonder eigen netwerk gedifferentieerd zijn. In het eerste scenario ligt
de welvaartsoptimale prijs onder de marginale kosten. De incumbent maakt dan zelf geen winst
en subsidieert de productie van bedrijven zonder eigen netwerk. In het tweede scenario ligt de
welvaartsoptimale toegangsprijs boven de marginale kosten als de markt niet geconcentreerd is.
Sleutelwoorden: broadband Internet market, imperfect competition, product differentiation,
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56Summary
In most European broadband Internet markets local loop unbundling is mandated under a
cost-based regulated access price. We construct a model for differentiated Cournot competition
between service-based and infrastructure-based ﬁrms, out of which one infrastructure-based ﬁrm
(the incumbent) supplies to the service-based ﬁrms. We seek for and compare the socially
optimal and the incumbent’s proﬁt maximizing access price in two scenarios: (i) service-based
ﬁrms and incumbent supply homogeneous services (partial differentiation), and (ii) all services
are horizontally differentiated (uniform differentiation). We show that in both cases the
incumbent never forecloses service-based ﬁrms if infrastructure-based competition is present or
if services are somewhat differentiated. Under uniform differentiation the welfare optimizing
access price is below marginal cost, hence the incumbent subsidizes the production of
service-based ﬁrms and makes zero proﬁt. In the case of partial differentiation, the same result
obtains when both markets are concentrated. Nonetheless, if markets are not concentrated, the
socially optimal access fee exceeds the marginal cost.
781 Introduction
Since the emergence of broadband Internet access services in the 1990s, telecommunication
networks have been regulated. In most EU countries regulatory authorities require the dominant
ﬁxed telecommunication ﬁrm to provide entrants with wholesale access to its network on a cost
oriented basis.1 This requirement is in compliance with the guideline of the Access Directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council passed in 2002 (European Commission (2002)).
Access regulation aims to increase competition at the services level by enabling entry without
the need for high infrastructure investments.
Since then, discussion has centered on whether this policy has been successful and whether
regulation should take a different direction. So far, consensus on the effects of unbundling and a
higher number of service-based ﬁrms has not been reached. On the contrary, concerns have been
raised that mandatory unbundling and access price regulation have dampened ﬁrms’ incentives
to engage in infrastructure-based competition.
Several empirical studies (Howell (2002), Aron and Burnstein (2003), Höfﬂer (2005), and
Wallsten (2006)) suggest that wholesale access policies aimed at increasing broadband diffusion
through service-based competition have not been successful. Using data of Western European
countries, Höfﬂer (2005) ﬁnds service-based competition to do poorly in stimulating broadband
diffusion while infrastructure-based competition has a signiﬁcant positive effect. Based on
OECD and ITU country data, Wallsten (2006) concludes that local loop unbundling has no
signiﬁcant effect on broadband penetration and, furthermore, sub-loop unbundling is negatively
related to broadband diffusion. He ﬁnds only on-site collocation to be positively correlated with
broadband penetration.
From the theoretical point of view, Distaso et al. (2006) study the relationship between
service-based and infrastructure-based competition and broadband diffusion, and ﬁnd somewhat
different results. They assume one incumbent and a variable number of service-based and
infrastructure-based ﬁrms compete in quantities. Broadband diffusion is interpreted as the total
demand for broadband access. Distaso et al. ﬁnd that infrastructure-based competition
unambiguously stimulates broadband adoption. Also service-based competition is found to spur
broadband diffusion given that the ratio of service-based ﬁrms to infrastructure-based ﬁrms is
not remarkably high. If the ratio is high, however, the positive effect of a further increase in the
number of ﬁrms within the dominant technology is partially or fully neutralized by the negative
effect of increased infrastructure-based concentration. Distaso et al. also ﬁnd that broadband
diffusion decreases in the access price but they do not deﬁne the socially optimal access fee.
The risk of exclusion is an important motivation for access regulation. Such regulation
1 Access may take place at various levels of the infrastructure: through resale, bit-stream access, shared access lines or
fully unbundled lines.
9prevents the incumbent from foreclosing service-based ﬁrms through high access prices. In
markets with multiple competing infrastructures whose owners are also present in the
downstream market, competition between networks may reduce the incentive for the incumbent
to exclude its downstream rivals. Several papers (Bourreau et al. (2007), Brito and Pereira
(2007) and Ordover and Shaffer (2006)) analyze the effects of unregulated access pricing in the
case of such a bilateral oligopoly. They conclude that in many cases an upstream network has an
incentive to supply its downstream rivals. After all, entry often reduces the market shares of the
incumbent’s upstream competitors. Competition between the upstream suppliers may then result
in low access prices. Ordover and Shaffer (2006) ﬁnd an exception to this result. If a
downstream retailer cannibalizes its supplier’s downstream market disproportionately, it may
lead downstream rivals to be foreclosed. In addition, Bourreau et al. (2007) ﬁnd that, depending
on the level of downstream product differentiation, upstream ﬁrms do not always compete to be
the downstream rival’s supplier which leads to access at higher prices.
In this paper we examine optimal access price regulation in a market with both service-based
and infrastructure-based competition. We assume that service-based ﬁrms have access to the
network of one incumbent. This is the case in most EU countries. In a model of Cournot
competition in differentiated services offered by service-based and infrastructure-based ﬁrms,
we compare the socially optimal access price with the incumbent’s privately chosen optimal
access price. We consider two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario service-based ﬁrms and the
incumbent offer homogeneous services, but infrastructure-based ﬁrms are differentiated. In the
second scenario, all ﬁrms are differentiated. In contrast to related papers, we have multiple
service-based ﬁrms, as well as multiple infrastructure-based ﬁrms. However, we do not analyze
the optimal number of ﬁrms.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that when the market is unregulated and service-based ﬁrms supply
homogenous services, the incumbent forecloses service-based competition only if no other
infrastructure-based ﬁrm is present in the market. When service-based ﬁrms supply
heterogeneous services, the incumbent never forecloses them from the market. These results are
in line with the general literature on foreclosure (see for instance Bijlsma et al. (2008)). This
suggests that under network competition, access prices do not necessarily have to be regulated.
Our second ﬁnding is that irrespective of how the services are differentiated, the incumbent
always chooses a higher access price than the socially optimal one. The socially optimal access
fee is however not necessarily cost-based. Under uniform service differentiation the socially
optimal access price falls below cost. When services are partially differentiated, the socially
optimal access fee can be above or below cost, that is, contain a positive or a negative price
mark-up. The mark-up depends on the degree of market power of service-based and
infrastructure-based ﬁrms. This is in line with Distaso et al. who ﬁnd that it is not always
desirable to promote the output of service-based ﬁrms, i.e. to set a low access price. If
competition is sufﬁcient between and over the networks, a positive access mark-up may
10subsidize the output of the incumbent and other infrastructure-based ﬁrms. Our ﬁndings
therefore support the notion that regulated access prices do not have to be cost-based, as is the
current practise in many European countries.
This paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the model. In chapter 3 we analyze the
ﬁrst scenario where only the infrastructure-based ﬁrms differentiate their services. In chapter 4
we study the second scenario where services of all ﬁrms are differentiated. Chapter 5 concludes.
Proofs of the existence of equilibria and propositions are in the appendices.
11122 Model Description
The model describes Cournot competition with horizontally differentiated goods, between n
service-based and m+1 infrastructure-based ﬁrms (n ≥ 1,m ≥ 0). Cournot competition is often
used in the industrial organization literature to model competition in the telecommunications
market even in the absence of capacity constraints,2 like for instance in our motivating paper
Distaso et al. (2006). Cournot competition enables us to model market power even when
services are stronger substitutes, which characteristics can be observed in the broadband Internet
access market. As evidence of that, one can think of the price mark-ups realized in the market.
The currently observed end-user prices are considerably higher than the cost of providing the
service to the customer (the marginal costs of providing broadband services are almost zero).
Service-based ﬁrms are indexed by i = 1,...,n, the incumbent by i = n+1, and the other
infrastructure-based ﬁrms by i = n+2,...,n+1+m. Infrastructure-based ﬁrms supply vertically
integrated services, that is, they own the networks over which they serve consumers.
Service-based ﬁrms, on the contrary, access the network of an infrastructure-based ﬁrm to
supply retail services. We assume that only one of the infrastructure-based ﬁrms, referred to as
the incumbent, supplies network capacity in the upstream market. The incumbent is not allowed
to discriminate in the access prices.
To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that a representative consumer has a linear inverse
demand function given by
p = α −Bq
where p denotes the vector of prices that a consumer pays for the services, q is the vector of
quantities consumed at these prices, and α and B parameterize the demand for given q. The
vector α and the symmetric matrix B are of dimension 1×(n+1+m) and
(n+1+m)×(n+1+m), the components of which are denoted by αi and βi,j, respectively. The
diagonal element βi,i of B is the own price effect of ﬁrm i’s output on the price set by ﬁrm i, and
βi,j is the cross price effect of ﬁrm j’s output on the price set by ﬁrm i. The relative magnitudes
of βi,i and βi,j thus deﬁne the level of differentiation between the services provided by ﬁrms i
and j. When βi,i equals βi,j, ﬁrms i and j supply homogenous services. The consumer surplus
2 Service-based ﬁrms might face capacity constraint in the backbones, however this case we assume away.
13associated with this demand function reads3





The numbers of service-based and infrastructure-based ﬁrms and the degree of service
differentiation between the ﬁrms can be seen as proxies for the degree of service-based and
infrastructure-based competition. We assume that ﬁrms have no ﬁxed costs.4 Service-based
ﬁrms are charged symmetric access prices for providing access services to end-users over the
incumbent’s network. For later use we deﬁne a as a vector of access prices ai with the following
characteristics
ai = a for all i ≤ n and ai = 0 otherwise.
The access prices paid by service-based ﬁrms constitute the wholesale access revenue to the
incumbent. We assume the upstream marginal costs to be equal for all networks, and it is set to
zero for simplicity. The access price charged by the incumbent can therefore be interpreted as a
price mark-up over its upstream marginal cost. Consequently, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are given by
πi = qi(pi −a) for all i ≤ n
πi = qipi +å
j≤n
qja for i = n+1
πi = qipi for i > n+1











The model consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the wholesale access price is set either by the
incumbent or the regulator. In the second stage, ﬁrms set their proﬁt maximizing outputs, given
the output of their competitors under differentiated Cournot competition. We ﬁnd the
equilibrium of the model by backward induction. We solve the model in two different scenarios.
In the ﬁrst scenario, referred to as partial differentiation, all services carried over a particular
network are homogenous, irrespective of whether the services are provided by service-based
3 Our deﬁnition of consumer surplus is in line with the literature on horizontal product differentiation, e.g. Singh and Vives










From this utility function exactly the same demand system arises when the representative consumer maximizes his utility
given his budget constraint.
4 Since the analysis is ex post with respect to investment and entry, all the infrastructure-based ﬁrms’ investments in
networks are sunk costs. Moreover, ﬁxed costs would be relevant only for the socially optimal access price. When
networks are not tradable, the opportunity cost of a network is zero. If networks were yet tradable, the regulator could set
the access price such that it yields zero proﬁt to the incumbent and thus zero opportunity cost to its network. In both
cases ﬁxed costs remain irrelevant in the analysis.
14ﬁrms or the incumbent. All services carried over different networks are horizontally
differentiated, that is, infrastructure-based ﬁrms supply differentiated downstream services. In
the second scenario, referred to as uniform differentiation, all downstream services are
uniformly differentiated, irrespective of the network through which the services are supplied.
15163 Partial Differentiation
In this scenario service-based ﬁrms and the incumbent supply homogeneous services, while
infrastructure-based ﬁrms supply heterogenous services. The demand parameters are hence
deﬁned as
αi = α > 0 for all i
βi,j = β > 0 for all i = j or i, j ≤ n+1
βi,j = γ ≥ 0 for all i 6= j and i > n+1 or j > n+1
To compare the access prices that prevail in the presence and absence of regulation, the socially
optimal access fee and the incumbent’s choice of access fee are solved for. The regulated access
price is set such that the sum of consumer and producer surpluses is maximized, provided that
the incumbent and the service-based ﬁrms are active in the market at that access price.5 When
the access price is not regulated, the incumbent sets an access price that maximizes its proﬁt.
3.1 Differentiated Cournot Equilibrium
In the second stage of the game, ﬁrms compete à la Cournot and set their proﬁt maximizing
output, given the output of their competitors and the access price which is determined in the ﬁrst
stage. The ﬁrst order conditions can be written as
p−a−Dq = 0
where D is a diagonal matrix of the own price parameters β. The equilibrium outputs at a given
access price a are
q(a) = (B+D)−1(α −a)
Since all ﬁrms of a certain type are symmetric, they produce the same output quantity. Due to
the symmetry in the equilibrium, from now on let S denote a service-based, A an
infrastructure-based ﬁrm, and I the incumbent. The outputs of each types of ﬁrms are
5 This deﬁnition of the social optimal access price follows the general literature on one-way access, such as Laffont and
Tirole (2000) and Vogelsang (2003). The Ramsey or second-best approach for social optimum is suitable since no
additional entry takes place in the markets.
17qS(a) =
αβ (2β −γ)−(2β −γ)(2β +γm)a






αβ (2β −γ)+(β (2β −γ)+(β −γ)γm)na
β [β(2β +γ(m−1))(n+2)−γ 2(n+1)m]
qA(a) =
αβ (2β −γ)+nαβ (β −γ)+βγna
β [β(2β +γ(m−1))(n+2)−γ 2(n+1)m]
The equilibrium qi(a)s are always non-negative if 0 ≤ γ ≤ β (or for later notation 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
where δ = γ/β). The equilibrium prices are
PS(a) = βqS(a)+a (3.2)
PI(a) = PS(a) = βqI(a)
PA(a) = βqA(a)
Service-based ﬁrms and the incumbent charge equal prices since they provide homogenous








The relationship between access pricing, outputs (3.1) and end-user prices (3.2) is described in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the equilibrium
(i) the output of a service-based ﬁrm decreases, whereas the price set by a service-based ﬁrm
increases in the access price,
(ii) the output of and the price set by the incumbent increase in the access price,
(iii) the output of and the price set by an infrastructure-based ﬁrm increase in the access
price if γ > 0; the access price has no effect on an infrastructure-based ﬁrm’s output and price if
γ = 0.
An increasing access price raises the marginal cost of a service-based ﬁrm, thus reducing its
output. The incumbent’s output increases in the access price because the outputs of
service-based ﬁrms and the incumbent are strategic substitutes. Since the aggregate decrease in
the service-based ﬁrms’ output is larger than the increase in the incumbent’s output, their total
output decreases. Therefore, the price for the homogeneous services provided by the
18service-based ﬁrms and the incumbent increases in the access price. Because the services
provided over different networks are strategic substitutes, the output of an infrastructure-based
ﬁrm will also increase in the access price. However the increase in the aggregate output of
infrastructure-based ﬁrms is less than the decrease in aggregate output provided over the
incumbent’s network, shifting the total demand for services of infrastructure-based ﬁrms
upwards. This increased demand leads to a higher price set by the infrastructure-based ﬁrms.
3.2 The Incumbent’s Choice of Access price
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the incumbent sets the access price to maximize its proﬁt. Given









































where qI(0) refers to the incumbent’s output when a = 0, and qI(0) > 0. This access price is

























This condition is satisﬁed for all n ≥ 1 and m if 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
In order to see whether the incumbent has an incentive to set an excessively high access price
at which it forecloses service-based ﬁrms, we compare the incumbent’s optimal choice with the
exclusionary access price. At the exclusionary access fee a service-based ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt,
that is
πS(aE
S ) = βq2
S(aE
S ) = 0
which here is equivalent to qS(aE






The relationship between (3.3) and (3.4) is described in the following proposition.
19Proposition 2. In equilibrium, for n ≥ 1, the following holds for the incumbent’s proﬁt
maximizing access price (3.3) and the service-based ﬁrm’s exclusionary access price (3.4):
(i) aI = aE
S if m = 0 or δ = 0, that is, foreclosure takes place in the case of network monopoly
or independent network services,
(ii) aI < aE
S if m ≥ 1 and δ > 0, that is, the incumbent allows for service-based competition if
it competes against any infrastructure-based ﬁrm and the services are at least somewhat
substitutes.
If services provided over different networks are maximally differentiated from each other
(δ = 0), service-based ﬁrms can only gain consumers at the expense of the incumbent. In this
case it is more proﬁtable for the incumbent not to supply service-based ﬁrms, hence the latter are
foreclosed from the market. The same argument holds in the absence of infrastructure-based
competitors (m = 0): it is more proﬁtable for the incumbent to operate as a monopolist in the
market. Note, however, that in this scenario, a (monopolist) incumbent and a service-based ﬁrm
always offer homogeneous services. If this assumption is relaxed it will be proﬁtable for the
incumbent to supply service-based ﬁrms.
If infrastructure-based competition is present (m ≥ 1) and a certain level of substitution
between networks’ services (δ > 0), the incumbent sets the access price below the exclusionary
level. This strategy is proﬁtable for the incumbent because service-based ﬁrms supply not only
some of the end-users the incumbent would supply if it foreclosed service-based competition,
but also some of the end-users the other infrastructure-based ﬁrms would serve. The increases in
wholesale revenues including from the market that the service-based ﬁrms gain from the
infrastructure-based ﬁrms outweigh the downstream market revenues foregone due to the loss of
consumers to the service-based companies.
3.3 The Socially Optimal Access Price
The socially optimal access price maximizes the social welfare as measured by the sum of
consumer and producer surpluses, subject to the participation constraints, that is, all ﬁrms should
make non-negative proﬁts. Because the infrastructure-based ﬁrms’ proﬁts are nonnegative
independent of the level of the access price, we only consider the participation constraints of the
incumbent and the service-based ﬁrms. As a ﬁrst step, we calculate the unconstrained access

































The sign of (3.5) depends on the numbers of service-based and infrastructure-based ﬁrms and
the degree of product differentiation, as is concluded below.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium, when 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the following holds for the unconstrained
welfare maximizing access price aW:













, then aW ≥ 0,
(ii) otherwise, that is, if mn < 8 or δ is very low, aW < 0,
(iii) aW < aI, that is, the unconstrained welfare maximizing access price is always lower than
the incumbent’s choice of access price.
The welfare maximizing access price can therefore be positive or negative. It is positive when
there is sufﬁcient competition either at service-based level or at infrastructure-based level and
when the services are relatively close substitutes. A positive access mark-up means that the
output of the incumbent and the other infrastructure-based ﬁrms is subsidized. If both markets
are concentrated (mn < 8, that is, the number of service-based and infrastructure-based ﬁrms is
low), then the welfare maximizing access price is negative and subsidizes the output of the
service-based ﬁrms.
However the welfare maximizing access price may yield negative proﬁt to the incumbent or
to the service-based ﬁrms, in which case the equilibrium is not feasible. Taking this into
consideration, the socially optimal access price cannot be lower than the exclusionary access
price of the incumbent and higher than the one of a service-based ﬁrm. The potential range of
the socially access fee is depicted in Figure 3.1 where each ﬁrm’s proﬁt is displayed as a
function of the access price.
We ﬁrst assess whether the exclusionary access price for a service-based ﬁrm will ever bind.
According to Proposition 2, the incumbent’s proﬁt maximizing access price is never higher than
the exclusionary access price for a service-based ﬁrm. As it is shown in Figure 3.1, the proﬁt of
a service-based ﬁrm (see πS) increases when the access price decreases. Moreover Proposition 3
guarantees that aW < aI, therefore the social welfare maximizing access price never exceeds the
exclusionary access price of a service-based ﬁrm, that is, aW < aE
S . Hence for δ < 1 the
service-based ﬁrm’s proﬁt constraint will never bind.
The lower the access price, the lower the proﬁt of the incumbent is (see πI in Figure 3.1).
Therefore there exists an access price aE







21Figure 3.1 Proﬁts as functions of access price, partial differentiation
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which is always negative. If the unconstrained welfare maximizing access price is below this
lower limit, the participation constraint of the incumbent is binding, and the socially optimal
access price equals aE
I . However if the unconstrained welfare maximizing access price is higher
than the incumbent’s exclusionary fee, the participation constraints are not binding, and the
former is the socially optimal one. Whether the participation constraints are binding or not
depends on the intensity of competition and the degree of service differentiation which are the
two measures of market power. According to Proposition 3, in highly concentrated markets or
when services between networks are weak substitutes, the welfare maximizing access fee is
negative. Since the regulator intends to intensify downstream competition, it can obtain it via an
access price as low as possible: that is the exclusionary fee which yields zero proﬁt for the
incumbent. The higher the number of service-based (n) or infrastructure-based ﬁrms (m), the
lower the market power downstream. As a consequence, it is more likely that the unconstrained
welfare maximizing access fee, which increases in n and m, exceeds the exclusionary fee. This
result is intuitive. Due to more intensive competition the regulator will let the incumbent earn
more (or lose less) in the wholesale market by setting a higher access fee than its exclusionary
one. This result holds true even for more differentiated services (small δ). However when the
number of service-based ﬁrms is small, the regulator will allow for a higher access price than the
exclusionary one only when competition can be still kept sufﬁcient, that is if services provided
over different networks are strong substitutes (large δ).
This result is summarized in the following proposition.
22Proposition 4. In the equilibrium, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
(i) if aE
I < aW, then the socially optimal access price equals aW as deﬁned in (3.5) and it is
an internal equilibrium of the welfare optimization problem,
(ii) if aW ≤ aE
I , then the socially optimal access price equals aE
I < 0, yielding a cornering
solution of the welfare maximization problem.
To summarize these ﬁndings, the socially optimal access price depends on the numbers of
service-based and infrastructure-based ﬁrms as well as on the own and cross price effects.
Generally speaking, the socially optimal access price is positive when the numbers of
infrastructure-based and service-based ﬁrms are high. Similarly, the access price is negative
when the ﬁrms are few in number. Setting the socially optimal access fee negative alleviates the
detrimental effects of market power by subsidizing the output of service-based ﬁrms. When the
access price is positive, on the other hand, it subsidizes the output of infrastructure-based ﬁrms,
including the incumbent. If the service-based ﬁrms and infrastructure-based ﬁrms are equal in
number, the socially optimal access price increases with the number of ﬁrms from negative to
positive.
23244 Uniform Service Differentiation
In this section we assume that all ﬁrms’ services are uniformly horizontally differentiated. The
demand parameters are therefore deﬁned as follows
αi = α > 0 for all i
βi,j = β > 0 for all i = j
βi,j = γ ≥ 0 for all i 6= j
Again we intend to ﬁnd the incumbent’s proﬁt maximizing access price in the absence of
regulation and the socially optimal access price maximizing the sum of consumer and producer
surpluses. We compare the equilibria with the ones of the ﬁrst scenario where only
infrastructure-based ﬁrms differentiate their services.
4.1 Differentiated Cournot Equilibrium
We consider the same game as described in section 2. Solving for the second stage, the outputs
of a service-based ﬁrm qS, the incumbent qI and an infrastructure-based ﬁrm qA as a function of
the access price a are given by
qS(a) =
α(2β −γ)−(2β +γm)a





qI(a) = qA(a) =
α(2β −γ)+γna
(2β −γ)(2β +γ (n+m))
In these expressions we explicitly denoted the dependency of the equilibrium quantities on the
access price, and these quantities are always non-negative if 0 ≤ γ ≤ β (or 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 where
δ = γ/β). The corresponding second stage equilibrium prices are
pS(a) = βqS(a)+a
pI(a) = βqI(a) = βqA(a) = pA(a) (4.2)







In contrast to the ﬁrst scenario, in this case where all services are uniformly differentiated, the
incumbent and the infrastructure-based ﬁrms charge equal prices and supply the same quantities.
This result obtains because these ﬁrms face now symmetric competitors and have symmetric
25costs. As before, the output produced by a service-based ﬁrm equals the output of the incumbent
minus a term linear in the access price. Thus, for a positive access price, the output of a
service-based ﬁrm is always lower than the output of an infrastructure-based ﬁrm. From (4.1)
and (4.2), the next proposition follows.
Proposition 5. In the equilibrium
(i) the output of a service-based ﬁrm decreases, whereas the price set by a service-based ﬁrm
increases in the access price,
(ii) the outputs of and the prices set by an infrastructure-based ﬁrm and the incumbent
increase in the access price if γ > 0; the access price has no effect on the output of and the price
set by any infrastructure-based ﬁrm if γ = 0.
This proposition shows that our qualitative ﬁndings on the relationship between access pricing,
output and end-user prices are the same in both models.
4.2 The Incumbent’s Choice of Access Price
The incumbent’s proﬁt maximizing access price and the exclusionary access price for a
service-based ﬁrm can be determined in the same way as in chapter 3. The exclusionary access
price for a service-based ﬁrm aE
S , i.e. the access price at which the service-based ﬁrm’s proﬁt

















Note that (4.4) is positive if the second order condition (SOC) is satisﬁed. The SOC states that

























For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and any n and m, this condition holds true. Given (4.3) and (4.4), the incumbent’s
access pricing behavior and its incentive to foreclose service-based competition can be
characterized as follows.
Proposition 6. In the equilibrium, for n ≥ 1, the following holds for the incumbent’s proﬁt
maximizing access price (4.4) and a service-based ﬁrm’s exclusionary access price (4.3):
(i) aI < aE
S if m > 0 or 0 ≤ δ < 1, that is, the incumbent allows for service-based competition
if it competes against any infrastructure-based ﬁrm or if the services are at least somewhat
differentiated,
26(ii) aI = aE
S if m = 0 and δ = 1, that is, foreclosure takes place in the case of network
monopoly and if services are homogenous.
Proposition 6 implies that the incumbent refrains from foreclosing service-based ﬁrms if there is
any other infrastructure-based ﬁrm or if the services are differentiated. Only when the incumbent
is a network monopolist and downstream services are homogenous it is optimal for the
incumbent to foreclose service-based competitors. Note the difference with the previous case of
partial service differentiation where the incumbent always forecloses service-based competitors
if δ = 0, whereas in this scenario when δ = 0 (that is maximum service differentiation), the
incumbent never forecloses service-based ﬁrms. This difference arises because here not only the
services provided in different networks, but also the services of service-based ﬁrms and the
incumbent are differentiated. It means that even at δ = 0 service-based ﬁrms generate extra
revenue for the incumbent, whereas in the previous case they cannibalize exclusively on the
incumbent’s market share. Recall for a moment Proposition 2. It implies that in the ﬁrst scenario
where service-based ﬁrms and the incumbent provide homogenous products, the incumbent
forecloses the service-based ﬁrms from the market only if no infrastructure-based competition
prevails. Proposition 6 is thus in line with Proposition 2. However, it also states that if
service-based ﬁrms differentiate their services, the incumbent has no incentive to foreclose them,
irrespective of the degree of infrastructure-based competition.
4.3 The Socially Optimal Access Price
The socially optimal access price is subject to the constraints that service-based ﬁrm and the
incumbent earn non-negative proﬁts,6 otherwise these ﬁrms will leave the market. As in chapter







This access price is always negative if 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. From (4.4) and (4.5) the following proposition
is straightforward.
Proposition 7. In the equilibrium, aW < 0 < aI, that is, the unconstrained welfare maximizing
access price aW is negative and always lower than the incumbent’s choice of access price aI
which is positive.
6 As in the previous case, infrastructure-based ﬁrms always earn non-negative proﬁts.
27Now the question is whether any of the participation constraints is binding. As in the preceding
scenario, there are different possibilities: either the non-negative proﬁt condition of a
service-based ﬁrm or the incumbent binds, or potentially none of the constraints bind (see Figure
4.1).
Figure 4.1 Proﬁts as functions of access price, uniform differentiation
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According to Proposition 6, at the incumbent’s proﬁt maximizing access price and for δ < 1,
none of the constraints is binding, implying that aI is the upper bound for the socially optimal
access price. Furthermore, the unconstrained welfare maximizing access price is smaller than
the incumbent’s proﬁt maximizing access price (Proposition 7), which in turn is smaller than the
exclusionary access fee for a service-based ﬁrm, therefore the constraint for a service-based ﬁrm
output (4.3) never binds at the welfare maximizing access price. As for the lower bound, we are
left with the possibility that at the welfare maximizing access price the non-zero proﬁt condition
for the incumbent does not satisfy. The exclusionary access price for the incumbent is deﬁned by
πI(aE













The welfare maximizing access price as deﬁned by (4.5), i.e. ignoring the participation
constraints, is lower than the exclusionary access price for the incumbent. Thus, for this access
price the incumbent’s participation constraint always binds. Based on the previous argument, the
following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 8. For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and for any n ≥ 1 and m, aW < aE
I < 0. It implies that in the
28social optimum the participation constraint for the incumbent is binding and therefore the
socially optimal access price aE
I is.
Like in the previous scenario, in this case the access price that maximizes the consumer and
producer surpluses is lower than the access price that is optimal for the incumbent. Moreover,
the socially optimal access price always equals the incumbent’s exclusionary access price,
yielding zero proﬁt to the incumbent and subsidizing the output of service-based ﬁrms. This is
due to the fact that all services are differentiated and therefore each ﬁrm carries some market
power over its services.
29305 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied wholesale access pricing in the absence of regulation for an
arbitrary number of m infrastructure-based and n service-based ﬁrms competing à la Cournot.
We compared these outcomes with the socially optimal access price. In the case of uniform
differentiation we ﬁnd that the socially optimal access price is always below cost, which
subsidizes the output of service-based ﬁrms, allowing the incumbent to earn zero proﬁt only. In
the case of partial differentiation the socially optimal access price can be above or below costs,
subsidizing in the ﬁrst case the output of the infrastructure-based ﬁrms, including the incumbent,
and in the second case the output of service-based ﬁrms. The socially optimal access fee only in
concentrated markets can yield zero proﬁt for the incumbent.
We also ﬁnd that in the presence of infrastructure-based competition, exclusion by means of
access pricing is never an equilibrium if products are differentiated. However there is an
important difference between the cases of partial and uniform differentiation if the services are
maximally differentiated (i.e. product are sold in separate markets). In the case of partial
differentiation, exclusion is an equilibrium, whereas in the case of uniform differentiation it is
not. This relates to the following effect identiﬁed by Ordover and Shaffer (2006). If entry
cannibalizes the incumbents’ products proportionally, which happens in the case of uniform
differentiation, competition to supply the entrant ensures that the entrant always obtains access.
When entry predominantly cannibalizes the incumbent’s products, which happens in the case of
partial differentiation, the entrant is not supplied in the equilibrium.
One might wonder what the equilibrium will be if other infrastructure-based ﬁrms than the
incumbent can also offer access to their networks. In that case the analysis of whether exclusion
is an equilibrium remains valid. Exclusion can only be an equilibrium if for any
infrastructure-based ﬁrm i given that no other ﬁrm offers access to its network, it is optimal to
charge the exclusive access price to a service-based ﬁrm. To analyze what the equilibrium will
be, we turn to Figures 3.1 and 4.1. At the access price which is optimal given that no other ﬁrm
provides access, all infrastructure-based ﬁrms want to be the incumbent: the proﬁts of the ﬁrm
providing access are higher than the proﬁts of a ﬁrm not providing access. Therefore the latter
will undercut the former. This will continue until there is no more to gain from undercutting, i.e.
until proﬁt πI equals πA. In the partially differentiated case the competitive access price will
therefore be larger than zero, whereas in the uniformly differentiated case the competitive access
fee will be zero. Under uniform product differentiation, the competitive access price will be
larger than the socially optimal access fee. However, in the partially differentiated case the
competitive access price can be either larger, smaller or equal to the socially optimal fee.
Several possible extensions come to mind that might change these results: (1) introducing
two-part wholesale tariffs, (2) allowing the infrastructure-based ﬁrm to discriminate between
different retailers, and (3) assuming Bertrand competition instead of Cournot. In addition, from a
31regulatory point of view it would be interesting to analyze the optimal number of service-based
and infrastructure-based ﬁrms in our model. This requires that we introduce ﬁxed costs and
determine welfare as a function of the access price and the number of ﬁrms. Of course, in the
absence of ﬁxed costs, increasing the number of ﬁrms increases welfare.
326 Appendix: Partial Service Differentiation
Proof. Existence of the equilibrium, stage 2 The equilibrium exists if the second order
conditions (SOCs) are negative. The SOCs are −D, which satisﬁes when the diagonal values of
matrix D, i.e. βs are positive. This always holds due to our assumption for β.
Proof. Proposition 1 A sufﬁcient condition for the equilibrium quantities to be non-negative is if
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 (where δ = γ/β).





β (β(2β +γ(m−1))(n+2)−γ 2(n+1)m)
For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and any n ≥ 1 and m, the nominator and the denominator of this expression are
positive. Therefore
∂qS
∂a < 0. For price change see (ii).




(β (2β −γ)+(β −γ)γm)n
β (β(2β +γ(m−1))(n+2)−γ 2(n+1)m)
(6.1)
For the same reason as (i),
∂qI
∂a > 0. From (3.2) and
∂qI























If γ = 0, i.e. independent services, then
∂qA
∂a = 0, so neither the quantity, nor the price of the
infrastructure-based ﬁrm changes in a.
Proof. Existence of equilibrium. Stage 1, incumbent From the incumbent’s proﬁt function the
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For the sufﬁcient equilibrium condition 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 the second term in brackets is positive,
therefore the left-hand side of the previous expression is smaller than the right-hand side if
2(n+4)+(m−1)(n+4)δ −m(n+2)δ2 > 0
This expression draws an inverted parabola in δ. Since at δ = 0 it takes 2(n+4) > 0 and at
δ = 1 it takes 2m+n+4 > 0, for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 it has only positive values (for any n ≥ 1 and m).
Therefore for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 SOC holds true.
Proof. Proposition 2 In the expression for the incumbent’s optimal access price (6.2) qi(0) is the





β . Using δ =
γ
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To prove that aI < aE
S , it is sufﬁcient to show that the nominator of the RHS is smaller than its












= mδ2(((n+1)δ −(n+2))mδ −(2−δ)(n+2))
The ﬁrst term in the difference is positive for 0 < δ ≤ 1 and m > 0, and equals zero for δ = 0 or
m = 0. This latter result implies that if δ = 0 or m = 0 then the fraction on the RHS equals 1, so
aI = aE
S , that is the incumbent forecloses service-based ﬁrms (proof of (i)). The second term is
34always negative, since both parts of that expression are negative for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and m > 0,n > 0.
Therefore for 0 < δ ≤ 1 and m > 0, aI < aE
S .
Proof. Existence of social welfare maximizing fee From the welfare function (2.1), the ﬁrst-order



















































































This expression is strictly negative for γ ≤ β (i.e. δ ≤ 1).
Proof. Proposition 4 The incumbent is an active player if it earns non-negative proﬁt, hence it is
excluded from the market if
πI < 0 ⇐⇒ βq2
I +nqSa < 0
In the equilibrium we require that proﬁt has a maximum which satisﬁes if SOC satisﬁes (see


















The access fee providing maximum proﬁt for the incumbent lays in between there intersection
and it is positive. Therefore for non-negative proﬁt only the lower a has to be considered. The
nominator of both a1 and a2 is always positive. According to (6.3), the denominator of a1 is











which is negative, and according to the proposition may bind.
35367 Appendix: Uniform Service Differentiation
Proof. Existence of the 2nd stage equilibrium The second order conditions are satisﬁed when the
diagonal values of matrix D are positive, that is β > 0.
Proof. Proposition 5 A sufﬁcient condition for the equilibrium quantities to be non-negative is if





(β −γ)(2β +mγ +nγ)+nβγ
(2β −γ)(2β +mγ +nγ)
It follows that for the previous sufﬁcient condition
∂ pS
∂a > 0 holds.
Proof. Existence of 1st stage equilibrium, incumbent Similarly to the partial differentiation case,
































Inserting the explicit expression for
∂qI
∂a , we ﬁnd that
nγ






























2(δ −2)(2mδ +nδ +4) < 0
where δ = γ/β. This shows that the second order condition is always satisﬁed for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Proof. Proposition 6 For 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 the exclusive access fee aE
S is positive. Therefore, it follows
from expression (4.4) that aI < aE
S if 4δ −2mδ +mδ2−4 < 0. Deﬁne
f(m,δ) = 4δ −2mδ +mδ2−4 = −4(1−δ)−mδ(2−δ). If m > 0, this expression is strictly





37By taking the difference between the nominator and the denominator:
2δ +(2−δ)(2+nδ)−(2−δ)(2+nδ)2+nδ2 = 2(δ −1)(nδ +2). This expression is
negative for any δ < 1 and zero for δ = 1, therefore aI > aE
S for any δ < 1 and aI = aE
S if for
δ = 1.
Proof. Existence of social welfare maximizing fee From the welfare function 2.1 the



































This expression is strictly negative for γ ≤ β (i.e. δ ≤ 1)..
























This value is always negative for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
To determine the relationship between aE


























This expression is always negative if δ ≤ 1, which is therefore also a sufﬁcient condition for
aW < aE
I to be satisﬁed.
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